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DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA:
SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES
1. SOCIOLOGY AND TRIE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES;
Development studies, as a separate f ie ld  o f  in terest in sociology, have 
been stimulated by the turbulent events in the countries o f the th ird world; 
particu larly by the recent history o f  countries emancipated from colonial 
rule- Major fo c i o f  interest have been attempts to explain why so many
newly independent poor countries have suffered p o lit ic a l in s tab ility , a re­
treat from principles o f  democratic ru le, minimal economic growth despite 
apparently constructive economic development programmes, the growth o f 
serious tr ib a l, regional, and ethnic divisions and con flic ts , and, in some 
casesrampant Nepotism, corruption, and parasitism, particu la 'ly  among 
p o lit ic a l and bureaucratic e l ite s ,  between whom and the masses o f  the popula­
tion , wide material inequalities have come to ex ist.
In th is regard the sociology o f  development has crucial insights to 
o ffe r , particu larly those which combat the a l l  too prevalent popular notion 
that the in s tab ility  o f developing non-White countries o f  the third world is 
due in soma way to a fixed  tendency towards corruption among the leaders, or 
to  an inherent incapacity on the part o f  the populations to govern in anything 
other than simple rural soc ie ties , or to a less-advanced position on a 
mythical scale of» ’ c iv i l is a t io n 1. The setbacks o f  the developing countries 
can a ll  be explained perfectly  well without any recourse to  conceptions o f  in ­
born socia l characteristics or to notions o f a backward, prim itive mentality 
among the populations o f  these countries.
Very broadly and at the risk o f  over-sim plification , we can say that the 
current problems o f many developing countries are due to'*' ^ :
a) the distortions and imbalances in the social order o f these 
societies which resulted from colonial rule*, a type o f  rule which gener­
a lly  was not concerned with bringing about orderly change and development 
in the whole society but only concerned with bringing about changes which 
would fa c il ita te  colonial rule i t s e l f  and benefit the metropolitan power. 
These ’ imbalances’ included, in ter a lia :
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The creation o f  a lo ca lly  sta ffed  and prestigious, but 
subservient administrative bureaucracy not trained to take 
responsible decisions.
The imposition o f  a type o f  education geared to the 
requirements o f  administrative and c le r ica l work in the colonial 
administration and to the culture o f the European power.
The stimulation o f  material expectations and aspirations 
among the loca l e lite s  which were appropriate to conditions in 
the metropolitan country, but not in the developing country.
The weakening or distortion o f  the roles and authority o f  
the trad itiona l leaders in the society.
The development o f  types o f  production and agriculture 
which were required by the colonial power but not necessarily 
most advantageous fo r  the newly independent country, and the 
creation o f modem, centralised institutions in the society 
which could be and were maintained by the authority o f  the 
colonial power but which were not su ffic ien tly  rooted in the 
society or supported by loca l values to function e ffe c t iv e ly  
a fter independence.
Another major problem resulting from the patterns o f  colonial conquest 
is  that the arbitrary boundaries o f  countries (particu larly in A frica ) 
embrace te rr ito r ie s  which were by no means ideal for the requirements o f  
viable nationhood. In many cases the countries are too small to support a 
healthy economy under typ ica lly  adverse conditions. In other cases the 
boundaries include peoples with highly divergent cultures, lik e  for example, 
the Ibo ’ s and the Hausa-Fulani peoples o f  Nigeria.
b) Certain e ffec ts  o f  the economic relationship between the developing 
countries and the major economic powers. Suffice to say here that there is 
considerable basis for saying that trade between the rich and poor countries 
and international aid tend to benefit the rich countries mom than the poor, 
and that other influences emanating from the wealthy nations strengthen retro- 
gressive p o lit ic a l tendencies and economic divisions in the poor countries.
c) The problems o f  developing countries can also be seen as resulting 
partly from the speed and extent o f  change to which the societies were sub­
jected during colonial rule and particu larly a fter independence. In the 
space o f  a few decades the administrations o f  most o f  the developing countries 
o f  A frica have been moved to  completely reorganise the liv es  o f  the mass o f 
the people, who had been part o f unchanging small-scale trad itional communi­
ties  with simple technologies but immensely complex and fixed patterns o f
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social interaction, supported by powerful and in trica te  belief-systems and 
mythologies, in which everyone had a c learly  defined role and sense o f  belong­
ing. The model fo r  the reorganisation in it ia l ly ,  almost without exception, 
was the mass technological society o f  the industrialised world. The archi­
tects o f independence and the po litic ians attempted to  set the societies on a 
course o f  change'towards. large-scale bureaucratic societies with centralised, 
nation-wide p o lit ic a l,  administrative, and economic institutions modelled on 
those o f  the more advanced technological societies. This type o f  society 
involves constant adaptation to changing technology, changing markets, and 
changing group interests in the society. Human relations are characterised 
by considerable instrumentality ( i . e .  by a well-developed awareness o f 
personal advantages and interests in socia l in teraction ), individuals have to 
strive  to achieve the ir status rather than having the socia l order ascribe i t  
for them automatically, and the number o f  d ifferen t roles and occupations for 
individuals in the society is  vastly greater than in trad itional society.
In the trad itional African society, therefore, production and technology was 
simple but custom was powerful and complex. The model o f  the industrialised 
society, on the other hand, is  one in which technology is  complex, custom and 
belief-systems are less complex, and social order and harmony is  achieved, 
not by direct community pressures and expectations, as in trad itional society, 
but by the fact o f  the larger majority o f  people being carefu lly socialised 
and trained to regulate th e ir  own behaviour fo r personal advantage and social 
security.
What has occurred in Africa is  that the p o lit ic a l,  administrative, and 
economic organisations o f ’ modern' societies were established quickly, and 
because o f  th e ir large-scale and comprehensive areas o f  operation, resulted 
in enormous power fo r individuals and groups in key positions - the new 
e lite s . These organisations include government departments, p o lit ic a l 
parties, organisations necessary to administer the economy, e tc ., as well as 
large heavy industries. However, other features necessary in the ’ modern’ 
society could not be established as quickly, or indeed, cannot be deliberately 
established at a l l .  The actions o f  powerful p o lit ic ian s , administrators, 
and businessmen have to be kept under surveillance and regulated by a w ell- 
informed public opinion, and by well organised trade unions with a balanced 
awareness o f  th e ir own in terests. Local community organisations have to be 
integrated into the national bureaucracy so that neither loses touch with the 
needs o f  the other. Family l i f e  and child train ing has to  be focussed on 
preparing individuals to survive in an atmosphere where a balanced and subtle
combination o f  aggression, competitiveness, in it ia t iv e ,  se lf-con tro l, 
patience, caution and hypocrisy are required fo r adequate performance.
Mass society requires some degree o f  mass-participation, which in turn 
requires mass lite racy  and mass communication - newspapers, magazines, and 
substantial rates o f  radio ownership.
These features o f  society are generally a l l  slow to develop, hence the 
po litic ians and administrators have been free to act without adequate public 
control, and have therefore been exposed to temptations which th e ir 
colléagues in western industrialised society are seldom exposed to - re la ­
t iv e ly  unrestricted and unregulated power to serve the ir own in terests, and 
to feather th e ir  own private nests.
With the establishment o f  p o lit ic a l parties and o f  administrations, 
modelled along colonial lin es , but expanded in order to administer the pro­
cesses o f  modernisation, an e l i t e  o f  po litic ians and bureaucrats has been 
created comprising, for the most past, people fo r  whom wealth and power is  a 
very new and t i t i l la t in g  experience. This group exists in extreme contrast 
to the poverty and powerlessness o f  the large mass o f  peasants and urban 
workers, since the former enjoy salaries and circumstances matching those o f  
the former colonial ru lers, whose places they have taken. Hence a very 
serious class division has come to ex ist in most developing African societies. 
Yet, the peasants and workers are not su ffic ien tly  aware o f  th e ir class- 
interests to organise appropriately and dissatisfactions and frustrations 
have often tended to coalesce around tr ib a l or regional loya lties  and hos­
t i l i t i e s .  The seething but uninformed frustration o f  the masses has also 
provided support for po litic ian s seeking quick success and m ilitary o ffic e rs  
staging coups. The organisations necessary fo r cu ltivating an informed 
awareness o f th e ir rea l interests among workers and peasants are absent - 
trade unions have not become powerful in most African countries - and the 
sporadic but intense manifestations o f  large-scale d issatisfaction have been 
unconstructively directed, producing p o lit ic a l in s tab ility  and l i t t l e  e lse .
The tragedy with many countries in A frica is  that the colonial powers 
demonstrated to  loca l populations the rewards o f  mass-organisation and 
modernisation, but because they allowed so few to participate responsibly in 
govemment and p o lit ic a l organisations, the d iscip line, s k il ls ,  and the 
everyday attitudes required to perform adequately in a modern administration 
were not properly imparted.
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d) I t  would also seem that many o f  the spec ific  techniques employed to 
encourage modernisation and change have been designed and applied without a 
proper analysis o f  the socia l situations in which they have been applied, and 
without adequate prior experimentation. Peasant subsistence farmers have 
been exhorted to work much harder and grow cash crops, and spec ific  techniques 
have been recommended without f i r s t  establishing whether these peasants are 
w illin g  to sacr ifice  le isu re, various types o f  socia l rewards, the security 
o f  mutual interdependence in the v illa ge  community (which includes community 
support fo r the individual homestead in times o f  need), in order to make 
re la t iv e ly  small p ro fits  from cash crop farming. Cash crop farming requires 
hard work, keeping produce fo r  your own gain, and a certain element o f  risk.
The element o f  risk is  particu larly important, since purchases o f  seeds, 
fe r t i l is e r ,  improved stock, e tc ., can result in debt i f  yie lds are in s u ffi­
cient. Also deterministic and supernatural b e lie fs  about the causes o f  gpod 
and bad harvests, typ ica l o f  peasants everywhere, are often not taken into 
account.
Then again, the type o f  leaders and instructors in loca l situations in 
the rural areas are often poorly trained. C r itica l shortages o f  educated 
people in poor countries meant that almost everyone with some education, 
shortly a fte r  independence, could obtain attractive work in the rapidly ex­
panding c iv i l  service in the c it ie s . Work in the rural areas came to be de­
valued, and th is stigma has tended to remain, despite growing unemployment in 
the towns. The crucial task o f providing services in rural areas suffers 
through lack o f  adequate s k ills . Generally, the type o f  education provided 
in mast African countries is  s t i l l  la rge ly  based on European curricula 
imported by missionaries and colonisors. Too few children are trained for 
practical tasks, and too many for the socia l accomplishments and the lite ra ry  
and arithmetical a b il it ie s  required fo r white co lla r work in the c iv i l  serv ice .
In large measure the continuing poverty o f countries in A frica  is  due to 
the high rate o f population increase o f  between 2% and 3% per annum. Birth
control programmes are urgently needed, but have l i t t l e  chance o f succeeding 
in communities where children are parents' only security in old age. The 
provision o f  social security and attempts to influence family planning must go 
hand in hand. Nowhere in A frica have these problems been tackled with any 
systematic po lic ies .
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Where loca l urban or rural organisations have been established to 
fa c il ita te  change in spec ific  situations (school-boards, service organisa­
tions, co-operatives, e t c . ) ,  many o f  the people involved have found them­
selves i l l  at ease in very novel situations. One almost inevitable response 
to the uncertainty o f  the new situation is  for participants to over-emphasise 
the formal, constitutional roles and to overlook the functions for which the 
organisations were established. As a result so many o f  the committees and 
groups involved operate in a type o f  s tu lt if ie d  ritu a l which achieves l i t t l e .
These, and hosts o f  other spec ific  problems need to be carefu lly studied 
before greater success w il l  be achieved in mobilising loca l communities for 
the tasks o f  modernisation and development.
The foregoing has been a very sketchy outline o f  only some o f  the 
reasons why many African states have fa iled  to l iv e  up to the promises o f  
independence. The rather shallow and emotional slogans and ideologies o f  
protest, and the mass p o lit ic a l organisation which accompanied the struggle 
for independence T^ ere far from su ffic ien t to mobilise and integrate the popu­
lation  at large for sustained mass action fo r modernisation. Despite out­
standing technical e ffo r ts  on the part o f  agricultural extension o ff ic e rs , 
participation o f  rural populations in the development o f  te rr ito r ie s  has 
been dissapointing, and involvement o f  rural populations i n p o lit ic a l l i f e  
and decision-making is  insign ifican t. Communication between the c ity  and 
the mass o f  the peasant populations has tended to deteriorate in many African 
countries.
In recent years there have been promising signs that a few p o lit ic a l 
leaders, particu larly President Ifyerere o f  Tanzania, are making a careful 
analysis o f  the i l l s  o f  independent A frica and are taking steps to counter­
act the trends which have been outlined above. Social scientists like  
Rene Dumont*, to give but one prominent example, are contributing s ig n i f i ­
cantly to the process o f  self-examination in A frica. I t  seems that one can 
anticipate an increased recep tiv ity  to ob jective c r it ic a l analyses o f  develop­
ment p o lic ies  by socia l scientists throughout A frica  in years to come.
False Start in A fr ica : Sphere, London, 1966.
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The role o f  the socio log ist in the f ie ld  o f  development studies is  four­
fo ld . F irst, intensive analyses o f  the causes o f  fa ilures in modernisation 
in spec ific  regions and countries must be mdertaken. Such analyses have 
to be somewhat more focussed than the usual analyses o f  socia l change and 
socia l dislocation. The nature o f  the processes occurring in particular 
African countries should be studied as movements towards modernisation, i .e .  
they should be studied within the framework o f  the goals o f  development. 
Secondly, much empirical and experimental work needs to be done in loca l 
communities, and particu larly in the setting o f  subsistence agriculture, in 
exploring the functioning and the usefulness o f  various modernising organisa­
tions, development techniques and educational techniques in spec ific  social 
and cultural situations in which p o lic ies  are applied. Thirdly, the impact 
on socia l and p o lit ic a l events o f  various types o f  economic programmes, in­
dustrial technology, and external economic and p o lit ic a l influences have to 
be looked at very carefu lly . Fourthly, and possibly most important o f a l l ,  
the socio log ist must take a c r it ic a l view o f developed industrial soc ieties , 
carefu lly consider the dislocation and lik e ly  setbacks which developing 
countries w il l  have to endure before attaining a state o f  modernness and 
technological sophistication, assuming that present po lic ies  are maintained, 
also equally carefu lly consider the value o f  aspects o f  trad itional African 
society, and on the basis o f  these assessments formulate a lternative goals 
for the societies and alternative po lic ies  for a solution o f the rea lly  
pressing problems o f  human need in the poor countries o f  A frica. Modern 
industrial mass consumption society with a l l  its  idealism and greed, crea tiv­
i t y  and dullness, magnificent technology and pollu tion , comfort and suburban 
boredom, exhilaration and neuroses, is  not the only model for developing 
societies to adopt as a goal. Mounting doubts about the qualit}’’ o f  
’ c iv ilisa tion * in the affluent societies have far-reaching implications for 
the th ird world. In short, the sociology o f  development, once the s c ie n tific  
analysis o f  ex isting problems in developing countries is well-established, 
and has provided the necessary insights, requires to become very practical 
and at the same time, id ea lis t ic  as w ell. Indications thusfar are that i f  
present trends continue, decades, i f  not a century or more, w il l  elapse before 
some under-developed states reach the stage where the opportunities and l i f e
chances o f  the mass o f  the people w i l l  improve s ign ifican tly . Some authors
2 )
believe that th is is  .inevitable' , but others have advanced convincing
arguments that meaningful human development can take place much sooner i f
African po litic ians and the ir known, and unseen advisors, inside and outside
the particu lar countries, relinquish many o f  the present goals o f  modernisa-
3)tion and formulate more re a lis t ic  models at which development should aim. .
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The sacred cows o f heavy industrial development;, booming c it ie s ,  increas­
ing gross-national product (without considering how wealth is  distributed) 
not to mention prestige buildings, sleek modern bureaucracies, armies o f 
Ph.D.’ s and academic achievement and education fo r  its  own sake need careful 
scrutiny. This is not to say that a l l  o f  these goals are not va lid ; they 
simply have to be balanced by the addition o f  human development as a central 
aim.
11. ;DEVELOPMENT * IN SOUTH AFRICA;
Over the past two or three years there has been a marked upsurge o f 
in terest in ’ development’ in South A frica. In part, the impetus fo r  this 
enthusiasm has spread to South A frica  from other parts o f A frica and from 
academic institu tions focussing on development studies in Europe and 
America. The obvious outlet fo r this interest are the impoverished African 
te rr ito r ie s  in Southern A frica , including the African reserves or ’ homelands’ 
which constitute roughly 14% o f  South A fr ica 's  te rr ito ry .
The need fo r development in the African ’ homelands' is  very pressing 
indeed. The extent and depth o f poverty is deeply disturbing. In one o f  
these te rr ito r ie s , Sekukuniland, i t  has been found that roughly 50% o f  African 
children die before the age o f  5 years . In the Transkei, i t  has been 
suggested that 40% o f  children die before the age o f  10 years"* . The average 
per capita income o f  Africans in the homelands appears to have been approxim- 
ately R101 to R113 per annum in 1966/67 . The homeland areas are, over­
whelmingly, areas o f subsistence agriculture. The performance o f  the subsis­
tence economy is  appallingly low. In most areas the grain y ie ld  is  only
7)roughly bags per morgen . In the Zulu homelands, near Durban,, for
example, the average maize y ie ld  is  roughly 1.8 bags per acre. In these
areas the average size o f  a household’ s cultivated land is  between 1.75 and
2 acres . I f  one considers that the annual grain requirements fo r a family
o f 6 is  about 16 bags the extent o f  the sh ortfa ll in good production is
obvious. In the Transkei, the 12% o f  the inhabitants who work outside the
area as migrant labourers earn s ligh tly  more than the to ta l Gross Domestic
Product o f  the Transkei. This is  a very clear indication o f  the very low
9)productivity o f  the Transkeian agriculture .
Many o f  these homeland areas could produce very much more than they do 
at present - even in agriculture. I t  has been estimated that these areas
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could provide an adequate standard o f  nutrition for more than 5 times their 
current underfed popu lations'^ . Some homeland areas have a very favour­
able agricultural potential ~ roughly three-quarters o f  the area o f  the home­
lands has an average annual ra in fa ll o f  over 20 inches, compared with roughly 
one-third o f  the area o f  the Republic as a whole11^. Although in some areas 
the advantages o f  high ra in fa ll are counteracted by the disadvantage o f  broken 
and h i l ly  terrain  (in  the Transkei less than one m illion o f  the to ta l o f  4.5 
m illion morgen is  suitable fo r arable farming), stockfarming could be much 
more lucrative than at present. Even areas with poor potential - lik e
Zululand, fo r example, where roughly 84% o f  the African reserve te rr ito ry  is
12)not arable - there is  nonetheless room fo r considerable improvement in 
y ie lds on the land which is  suitable and fo r improved stock farming on the 
remainder.
The Department o f  Bantu Administration and Development and the Bantu 
Investment Corporation are rendering salutary service in the agricultural and 
general development o f  the reserves. However, there would appear to  be a 
need fo r  and a scope for private organisations, including churches, to contri­
bute to the development o f  these areas. In order that such e ffo r ts  be 
appropriate to the needs o f  the African people, however, i t  is  necessary to 
consider the problem o f development in the ligh t o f  the broader socio­
p o lit ic a l situation in South A frica.
The development o f the homelands in South A frica is  being presented 
to the world and to people in th is country as a ju s tifica tion  fo r permanently 
withholding p o lit ic a l rights and rights to land and property ownership from 
Africans in the major part o f  South A frica  - the 'White' areas, which include 
v irtu a lly  a l l  c it ie s ,  towns and developed industrial and agricultural areas.
In compensation, Africans are being granted rights which are centred in and 
restricted  to  the ’homelands', which are being developed towards p o lit ic a l 
independence in the future. Since South A fr ica 's  economy is  dependent on 
Africans fo r 70% o f  its  labour requirements, and since there is  no Indication 
that the proportion o f  Africans in the labour force is  lik e ly  to decrease in 
future years, very considerable economic interdependence betweeen the 
'homelands* and the rest o f  South A frica is  inevitab le, in perpetuo,
Although the authorities, presently encourage White capital to establish 
industrial undertakings in the reserves in order to provide some employment 
for the ’homeland* labour force in the ir own areas, this development is  not 
lik e ly  to  be strik ing ly  successful . In fa ct, as Professor Reynders has
10.
shown, i t  seems that i t  is going to be only just possible for industry in the 
reserves and in the border industrial areas, to absorb a l l  new male entrants
ill)
to the labour force in the reserves-  , (and the bulk o f opportunity is  lik e ly  
to be in the border industrial complexes in 'White* South A fr ica ). Bearing 
in mind these p robab ilities , the o f f i c ia l  goals o f  separation and development 
are not l ik e ly  to lead to any s ign ifican t decrease in the extent to which 
future industrial growth in South A frica as a whole is  dependent on African
15 )
labour. As Thomas points out , the needs o f  the economy are l ik e ly  to be
met, increasingly, by e ff ic ie n t  transportation o f  African migrant workers to
and from the reserves, border areas, and other industrial areas on a daily,
IB )weekly, and monthly basis . When a government minister said in 1968 that 
i t  was the government's intention to  proceed to  build South A fr ica 's  economy
17)
on contract (migrant) labour ' ,  he was merely stating the re a lity  within 
which the separation o f  the races is  lik e ly  to  be pursued as long as the pre­
sent government remains in power. For these reasons, the homelands can 
never be independent from South A frica in a fu ll  sense.
In addition to  the ex isting patterns o f  labour migration between the
'homelands* and South A frica , i t  seems that a steady stream o f  Africans from
the ’White’ areas are l ik e ly  to be resettled  in the homelands in towns and
other settlements close to *White* industrial complexes. Thus more and more
migrant labourers are l ik e ly  to be added to the present figure o f  somewhat
18)over one m illion . Already the ’homelands' have a s ign ifican tly  higher 
population density than the rest o f the country (over twice the population 
density o f  the country as a whole), and th is disparity is  l ik e ly  to increase 
in future years as a result o f both the high rate o f  increase in the reserves 
(2 to 3% per annum) and as a resu lt o f  resettlement p o lic ies . Although i t  
is  c learly  impossible fo r  a l l  the Africans in the ’ White* urban areas to be 
resettled  in the 'homelands’ , the la tte r  seem destined to carry the increas­
ing burden o f  a r t i f ic ia l  population increase in years to come.
Attempts to encourage development in the homelands should take account 
o f  the fact that the o f f i c ia l  homelands development policy is ,  in part, a 
cynical attempt to ju s tify  continuing apartheid in the 'White* areas, and a 
means o f  enabling more and more Africans to be removed from the ’ White* areas. 
This cynical instrumentabi3.ity is  by no means characteristic o f  the attitudes 
o f  a l l  the o f f ic ia ls  working in the departments responsible for homeland 
development, nor is  i t  characteristic o f  a ll  the supporters o f the government.
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However, the conception o f  ’homeland' development as a means o f  leg itim ising 
White control in South A frica is  an important central element in the policy 
o f  separate development and this fact cannot be overlooked.
There are a number o f  additional implications in the policy o f  separate 
development fo r the future o f  the uhder-developed regions in South A frica.
Some p oss ib ilit ie s  and probabilities are outlined below.
1) Many 'homelands' w ill  probably have to continue to ex is t as small,
fragmented and discontinuous te rr ito r ie s . The reserves in Natal are one
example o f  th is , and so are the Tswana homelands. The policy o f eperate
Development has been launched with White interests in mind, and th is policy
basis is  not compatible with the expropriation o f  large chunks o f  'White1
19)te rr ito ry  in order to enlarge and consolidate the homelands . Furthermore, 
since the policy has derived much o f  its  ideologica l content from Afrikaans 
Nationalist ideals, i t  sp ec ifica lly  requires that d ifferen t Bantu 'Nations' 
develop separately. Thus, possible advantages to be derived from consoli­
dating and combining some o f the smalller reserves into substant5.al blocks o f 
land', w i l l  be lo s t. The ju stifica tion  given to the policy o f  'homeland5 frag­
mentation is  that evidence from elsewhere in Africa suggests that d ifferen t 
tribes do not welcome integration with one another and that attempts to force 
such integration have resulted in in te r-tr ib a l con flic t. Trie re are un­
doubtedly examples o f  such con flic t. (N igeria and to a lesser extent Zambia, 
being prominent examples), but there are also te rr ito r ie s  in A frica  (more o f 
them in fa c t) where the existence o f  d ifferen t tribes has not resulted in dis­
ruptive con flic t. (Ghana, Tanganyika, being examples) .  Furthermore, 
tr ib a l con flic t , where i t  has occurred, has usually been vastly exacerbated 
by economic con flic ts , the opportunism o f  certain p o lit ic ian s , and by in ­
articu late frustrations which find indirect outlet in 'a r t i f i c ia l '  tr ib a l con­
f l i c t .  The chances are that i f  no tr ib a l divisions had existed in African 
te r r ito r ie s , con flic t would have taken other forms. This is  not to  say that 
there are not many advantages in tr ib a l homogeneity, but i t  is  doubtful 
whether these advantages outweigh the tremendous economic disadvantages o f  
the fragmentation o f  the reserves o f  South A frica  into 8 separate future mini­
states, with some o f  these 's ta tes ' based on numerous disconnnected pieces
- , .20)or land
An additional point that requires to be borne in mind is that the South 
African system o f  separate development fo r d ifferen t 'Ethnic Units' does not
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exclude the p oss ib ility  o f  tr ib a l r iv a lr ie s . The concept o f  ’ t r ib e ’ has no
fixed reference. The Xhosa-speaking people o f  the Transkei ’ homeland’ for
example, are composed o f  a number o f  clusters o f  tribes under paramount
ch iefs. Despite s im ila rity  o f  language, there have been signs o f  strong
91)
in te r-tr ib a l r iva lr ies  in the Transkei
2) In many ways the presence o f  the powerful and wealthy state o f  
South A frica  confers economic advantages on under-developed states in 
Southern A frica which many other African te rr ito r ie s  lack. For Malawi, 
Mocambique, Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland, the Republic at least o ffe rs  
opportunities fo r some cash income through migrant labour, even i f  such 
labour is  poorly paid. I f  one views the 'homelands’ as prospective inde­
pendent states whose economies and per capita incomes are to be compared with 
other African countries rather than with those o f  South A frica, then the 
te rr ito r ie s  can be seen as enjoying the same advantages. Yet the ways in which 
the labour o f  the homelands is  lik e ly  to be exploited fa lls  far short o f  the 
ideal as fa r as the ’homeland’ te rr ito r ie s  themselves are concerned.
F irs tly , the migrant labourers only remit a proportion o f  th e ir  wages home - 
the bulk o f  these wages are spent in the ’White’ areas. With migrant
workers from the Transkei, for example, only 20% o f the ir earnings are sent 
22)back . Secondly, the p ro fits  o f  the industries in which the migrants 
work are not able to be taxed by the 'homeland’ authorities. Industries 
established inside the ’homelands’ w il l  be ’ foreign ' companies, exporting 
most o f  th e ir p ro fits  back into the Republic. Thirdly, the absence, fo r 
long periods each year, o f  migrant workers means that the ’homelands’ are 
deprived o f  a large proportion o f  th e ir  most productive manpower. In addi­
tion , in years to come, terms o f trade and t a r i f f  arrangements between the 
’homelands’ and South A frica could operate to  the re la tive  disadvantage o f 
the former, as is  the case with most under-developed states in th e ir  trading 
relations with industrialised countries. Raw materials and basic foodstuffs 
are exported at re la t iv e ly  low prices, whereas finished products are imported 
at re la t iv e ly  high prices. In th is way 'homelands' could conceivably help 
to subsidise the re la t iv e ly  high wages paid to non-migrant workers in the 
Republic. We might find a ’ rich get richer and the poor get poorer’ syn­
drome in the relationship. A growing disparity in wealth between the 
developed and the under-developed areas in Southern A frica is  inevitable any­
way, but the disparity could be even wider as a result o f  the possible pro­
cess outlined above.
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3) I t  would appear that the 'homelands’ lik e  so many other African 
te rr ito r ie s  are lik e ly  to inherit a re la t iv e ly  very wealthy tiny minority o f 
bureaucrats and traders when they do attain independence. Because the 
African c i v i l  servants w il l  have been employed formerly in the Department o f 
Bantu Administration and Development at a re la t iv e ly  high wage rate (a lb e it 
lower than that o f Whites) th e ir  position w ill be very favourable re la tive  
to the rank and f i l e  o f  ’homeland* c itizens.
23 )
By 1969 there were already 4 500 African traders in the ’homelands'1” , 
many o f  them established with assistance from the Bantu Investment Corpora­
tion. In a recent interview, the Deputy Minister o f  Bantu Administration
and Development, Dr. Koomhof spoke with pride o f  individual African entre-
29-)preneurs who had accummulated great wealth and luxurious motor cars 
While trading a c tiv ity  enables individual Africans to gain valuable business 
experience which could be applied to more productive a c tiv ity  in time to 
come, i t  is  regrettable that the traders should become inordinately wealthy 
in relation  to the mass o f  the people. Thus we can already see the 
nascience o f  a sharp class division developing in the homelands.
H) As has already been mentioned, the resettlement o f  African popula­
tions formerly liv in g  in 'White* areas seems lik e ly  to result in a substantial 
growth o f urban populations in the 'homelands'. Already over 106 000 urban 
dwellings have been b u ilt , and, according to the Deputy Minister o f  Bantu
Administration and Development, no fewer than 159 new towns in the ’homelands*
25)have been planned’, a number o f  which have already been bu ilt . Urban
settlement in the homelands appears to be the single largest item on the
26)budget for 'homeland' development . I t  is  quite conceivable that the 
’homeland5 te rr ito r ie s  w il l  Soon be the most urbanised African areas on the 
continent.
Urban development can bring with i t  tremendous advantages i f  sudi devel­
opment draws families away from over-populated and poverty-stricken subsis-r- 
tence farming areas, and i f  such urban development provides a stimulus for 
improved agricultural production in the rural areas. At the moment, urban 
development in the ’ homelands’ is  probably doing neither. The populations 
are, generally, resettled  groups from the ’ White’ areas, and the produce they 
consume is  produced in the 'White’ areas. There also appears to be l i t t l e  
o f the type o f contact between urban and rural areas which is  l ik e ly  to
diffuse improved expertise and changed attitudes to production to the rural
areas. I t  seems that the ’homeland' te rr ito r ie s  are lik e ly  to inherit almost
27)the very same problem which Dumont~ and others find in A frica  - alienation 
o f  the poverty-stricken rural areas from the new towns and c it ie s .
5) In its  anxiety to stimulate development as rapidly as possible., the
government is  spending large amounts on the establishment o f  certain economic
growth points in the reserves. For example, the cost o f  Sithebe, Natal’ s
28)
f ir s t  industrial growth point w ill  be about R7,2653000 in a l l  . This
le ve l o f  expenditure on development is  obviously a very welcome and positive
contribution. Hoxiever, in view o f  the points made under <+ above, and in
view o f  the extremely high cost o f  creating heavy industrial employment in
growth points (approximately R4 000 per job) i t  is  a p ity  that expenditure
on development is  not more evenly spread between growth points and new tom s
on the one hand, and on the rural subsistence economy on the other. A
dramatic illu stra tion  o f  the re la tive  neglect o f  the la tte r  is  the fact that
there are four times the number o f  trained White personnel in the Parks
Board in Natal as there are in the agricultural section o f  the Department o f
29)Bantu Administration and Development in Natal . In 1970 there were only
roughly 750 trained African agricultural extension o ffic e rs  in the f ie ld  in
30)a l l  the reserves combined
6) The wider soc io -p o lit ica l framework also imposes a certain charac­
ter on human relations and communication in development in South A frica.
To a large extent development is  being pursued by the government with
u lterio r motives, and many Africans are aware o f  this and react to th is .
A study o f my own in Durban, fo r example, has shown that less than .10% o f
Africans in a Durban Township view the 'homelands1' and the ir development
31)favourably . The p o lit ic a l issues in development in South A frica , plus 
the fact that the government does not encourage the more a ltru is t ica lly  
motivated White 'l ib e r a ls ’ and academics to participate in the development 
o f the 'homelands’ has probably created an image o f  development which w ill  
not assist in gaining the whole-hearted support o f  the ’ homeland’ communities.
These are some o f  the particular characteristics and problems o f 
development in South A fr ica 's  African reserves which result from the wider 
p o lit ic a l po lic ies in terms o f which the development is presently taking 
place. In the third section o f  th is paper, some o f  these problems w il l  be
15.
referred to once again in considering what constructive action can be taken 
in loca l development issues. The p o lit ic a l implications o f ’homeland' 
development prompt many talented and well-meaning people in South A frica  to 
avoid taking any constructive interest in problems in th is area. In certain 
opposition c irc le s . Black and White, the fee lin g  is  that the more fu lly  the 
(homelands' are developed, the more the government w il l  be encouraged to re­
se ttle  Africans from the 'White* areas in these areas-, thus aggravating 
problems in the 'homelands' and alienating more and more Africans from the 
places where they are l ik e ly  to work fo r  the rest o f  th e ir liv e s . This 
attitude is  very understandable, but i t  does represent somewhat o f  an over­
sim plification . These are many more factors impinging on the issue o f  the 
future o f  Africans in the 'White* areas than the extent o f  development in the 
'homelands'. One o f  these factors is  the tremendous cost o f  transportation 
which the government w i l l  have to bear (o r  subsidise generously) i f  very many 
more Africans in 'White1 areas are resettled  far away from the ir places o f 
work. There are, however, many other factors as w ell, and even the
National Party press has recently published pleas fo r  a 'd if fe re n t ' policy
32 )with regard to  urban Africans in 'White5 areas . Furthermore, there are 
possibly ways in which the development o f  the 'homelands' can benefit the 
p o lit ic a l and economic position o f a l l  Africans in South A frica, as w ill be 
pointed out presently. There seems no cogent reason why everyone who is  
responsive to human need should not seek opportunities to assist in the 
development o f under-developed regions in South A frica.
I I I .  ACTION FOR DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA:
In considering what lines o f action to  suggest fo r  development in South 
A frica , the social sc ien tis t in the loca l situation must take a wide range o f 
factors into account. He must heed the mistakes and successes o f  modernisa­
tion and development in A frica as a whole. He miist take into account the 
particu lar constraints and opportunities in the loca l situation (keeping a 
wary eye on p o lit ic a l and idéologioal p i t fa l ls ) .  He should also make a 
c r it ic a l assessment o f  the goals o f  development, guarding against the u lterior 
motives o f po litic ian s , on the one hand, and, on the other hand, against his 
own ethnocentric biases in favour o f  a particular model o f  society as a goal 
(the bias is  usually in favour o f  the model o f  the industrialised, technologi­
cal, mass-consumption soc ie ty ). Then, with a l l  these considerations in mind, 
he must look at the grass-roots situation o f  under-development in the reserves,
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rea lis ing that the problem is  not only one o f  simple poverty, but also one o f 
deeply entrenched trad itiona l conservatism, and o f  economic backwardness,
33)
which implies much more than poverty. As Hobart Houghton has pointed out 
(in  regard to the Transkei) economic backwardness involves a vicious c irc le  
o f  'deb ilita ting* factors which reinforce each other. These factors include 
poor health., and education, apathetic attitudes, low productivity, low or 
non-existent income, low capacity to save, absence o f  cap ita l, lack o f struc­
tures and organisations through which development can occur*, which in turn re ­
inforce low productivity, e tc ., etc.
With a l l  these factors in mind, I w ill attempt a few broad and tentative 
suggestions fo r  action aimed at development in South A fr ica 's  reserves. I 
w il l  not be so presumptions to attempt any recommendations in regard to the 
larger questions o f o f f i c ia l  development policy. Even i f  I had the knowledge 
to do th is , such proposals would not meet the present need, which, as I under­
stand i t ,  is essentia lly  fbr ideas about what private bodies can contribute to 
development. In thinking o f  private organisations, I  am including not only 
churches and mission establishments, but other service organisations as w ell, 
such as un iversities, university in stitu tes, private institu tes fo r the study 
o f South A fr ic a ’ s problems, as well as voluntary organisations.
I t  is  always easiest to be negative, and therefore the f i r s t  possible 
task for private organisations which comes to mind is  that o f studying govern­
ment policy and its  e ffe c ts  very thoroughly in order to c r it ic is e  authorita­
t iv e ly  those aspects o f  policy which are adverse in th e ir e ffe c ts . As a 
standard fo r assessing policy and its  e ffec ts  one can take the concepts o f 
'human development’ and 'community development'. These aspects o f  policy 
which are not aimed at the fu lle s t  possible human development fo r the greatest 
possible number o f  people require to be c r it ic a lly  evaluated in public. 
S im ilarly, aspects o f  policy which do not have as an ultimate goal the u p lift-  
ment o f  whole communities to a stage at which they can participate responsibly 
and free o f  external manipulation in the economic and p o lit ic a l l i f e  o f 
Southern A frica , should also be c r it ic a lly  evaluated in public.
Unless one is  completely and intractably committed to the ideal o f  a 
common society fo r a ll  territor5.es within South A frica , there is  a great deal 
o f  merit to be found in certain aspects o f  the present government's po lic ies , 
and with regard to these aspects the government should be given its  due. On
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the other hand, there are aspects o f  o f f ic ia l  policy and there are also cer­
tain possible implications in government policy which are very much less 
commendable from the point o f  view o f  'development* as outlined above. Some 
o f  these aspects and implications have been mentioned in the previous section.
I t  is  doubtful for example, whether township development or population 
resettlement schemes in areas where there is  l i t t l e  work available and no 
scope fo r  agriculture can be called development . Sim ilarly the prohibi­
tion on construction o f  further family dwellings fo r  Africans in 'White' areas 
leading e ither to i l le g a l  lodging or to settled  urban dwellers being forced to 
move to reserves, from where they have to migrate to the ir places o f  work, 
cannot be seen as re la tin g  to sound development in any way . The d i f f i ­
cu lties presently being faced by Bantu authorities in Zululand in accommodat-
36)ing displaced people are also not part o f  healthy development
At a broader le v e l,  there are the disturbing implications o f  the policy 
o f  separate development which arise from the p oss ib ility  that the mutual 
economic interdependence o f  South A frica  and future p o lit ic a lly  independent 
'homeland' states w il l  lead to a type o f  'n eo-colon ial' manipulation o f  weak 
states by a powerful controlling power. Some degree o f  economic in ter­
dependence w il l  be unavoidable, but dangers o f economic links leading to a 
'puppet' independence in the future (with a l l  .it 's  attendant e v i ls )  must be 
combatted by constant well-founded c r it ic a l comment. Other disturbing impli­
cations o f current po lic ies  have already been mentioned (in  the previous 
section) and require no further comment here. Suffice to say that certain 
aspects o f  separate development have proceeded foo fa r to be halted or 
reversed - rea lity  demands that they be accepted. But, these aspects tend 
to have two faces - on the one hand the genuine face o f  healthy development 
for cu lturally d istinctive peasant communities which are at this stage only 
very tenuously integrated into the common area o f  South African society; on 
the other hand, the more cynical face o f  separate development as ju stifica tion  
for continued domination over a l l  Blacks. The former can be encouraged to 
the fu l l ;  the la tte r  must constantly be exposed fo r  what i t  is .
In considering practical development aid which private organisations can 
o ffe r , one is  faced with certain practical lim itations. The most important 
lim itation  is  the restric tion  on entry into the African reserves for any non- 
African private individual with the exception o f  ministers o f  re lig ion .
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Permission can be obtained but delays and red tape tend to discourage 
individuals. This is  where the church is  in a very favourable position. 
Heedless to  say, i t  is  extremely regrettable that well-intentioned people 
have the ir access to the reserves lim ited by regulations and red tape.
Contributions to development have to be formulated within a framework 
o f goals for the te rr ito ry  concerned. Increasingly, i t  is  being emphasised 
by experts that the goal o f  a highly mechanised affluent, mass-consumption 
society is  inappropriate fo r  under-developed te rr ito r ie s  in A frica ' (o r 
elsewhere fo r  that matter). Some industrialisation is  obviously necessary, 
but the cost in investment o f  very rapid industrialisation is  so great 
(Hobart Houghton mentions a capital investment o f  up to R7 000 per job in 
industry in the Transkei) that this cannot be the only strategy fo r develop­
ment . Development must also rest on the improvement and transformation o f 
agriculture. Furthermore, this transformation should not be sought with 
prim arilly economic goals in mind. The socia l costs o f  sw ift economic 
development may be so great as to o ffs e t  material advantages. Social d is­
location, the breakdown o f  family l i f e ,  the erosion o f  communal values in 
trad itional culture, and the community conflicts which can arise from causing
peasants to become greedy and competitive, are prices which are too high to
38)pay for economic development . The emphasis should be firs t.on  the eradi­
cation o f  hunger and disease, and then on commmity development rather than 
purely on economic development.
I t  has been shown that there is  scope for the development o f  trad itional
African agriculture, provided certain re la t iv e ly  minor adjustments can be
39)made to customary laws re la ting to land tenure . The Department o f  Bantu 
Administration and Development is  attempting to achieve development within the 
framework o f trad itional practice with it s  v illa ge  resettlement schemes which
i*.Q )
rationalise patterns o f  grazing and planting . I t  would seem as i f  such
schemes have merit, but require far more intensive guidance from agricultural 
extension o ffic e rs  than is  presently being given. There are, fo r example, 
only roughly 50 African agricultural o ffic e rs  in Zululand. Not only should 
the government be encouraged to boost this number, but loca l churches can 
assist in the process o f  communication. There is  no reason why churches 
should not arrange meetings between agricultural o ffic e rs  and loca l peasants 
in groups, and. then assist peasants in understanding the guidance given and 
in overcoming their problems, fears and reservations. There are probably 
other ways in which churches can fa c ilita te  the communication between 
agricultural o ffic e rs  and loca l peasants.
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A tremendous problem a ffec tin g  traditional agricultural development is  
the fact that such a large proportion o f  able-bodied males are absent due to 
the migratory labour system. This proportion is  as high as 70% in some 
areas. Abundant migrant labour from the reserves also has another e ffe c t , 
that o f  contributing towards low wages fo r Africans in the c it ie s  and in the 
economy generally. I f  the number o f  migrant labourers o ffe r in g  the ir ser­
vices in distant c it ies  can be reduced i t  w il l  not only benefit the economic 
circumstances o f  urban Blacks in general, by giving them greater bargaining 
power, but i t  w il l  also benefit agriculture in the reserves. This is  one way 
in which the development o f the ’homelands' w ill  assist in the general, im­
provement o f  the circumstances o f  a l l  non-Whites in the Republic.
However, at the present time the populations in the reserves desperately 
need the cash income derived from migrant labour. One theoretica l solution,
or attempt at a solution, could be the follow ing. I f  blocks o f  land d is­
persed among the tr ib a l lands in the reserves could be set aside fo r indus­
tr ia lis ed  agriculture, run by the Bantu Authorities themselves, then wage 
employment could be o ffered  to would-be migrants close to their own gardens. 
Employment would have to be on a part-weekly basis to allow men to do the ir 
own ploughing and planting as well as working. Such industrialised agricu l­
tural projects would have to include some processing o f  produce or other 
ligh t industrial functions, in order to  make i t  possible fo r some work to be 
offered  a l l  year round. This would not only o ffe r  opportunities fo r cash 
income close to the tribesman's home, but such schemes would have a powerful 
'demonstration e f fe c t ' on the loca l subsistence agriculture and provide workers 
with experience relevant to th e ir  own farming problems. Others have also 
mentioned the des irab ility  o f some type o f  organised agricultural production, 
in order to stimulate the agricultural development o f  the reserves . This 
type o f  development has certain advantages over agricultural settlement 
schemes with freehold t i t l e ,  particu larly since the la tte r  often disrupt 
social l i f e ,  undermine the co-operative basis o f  trad itional African society, 
and tend to fa c il ita te  the emergence o f  an agricultural landowning e l i t e  who
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in turn exp lo it less favourably placed peasants
I f  land and other resources permit, churches and mission establishments 
could take a lead in th is type o f  development by starting experimental pro­
jects on which loca l peasants are employed in organised farming and in small- 
scale processing o f farm produce, or other forms o f  small-scale production
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fo r 'the loca l market., or in the construction o f  irr iga tion  dams, furrows, etc. 
fo r crop production. A large number o f  practical problems would have to be 
overcome to make such a project successful, but the purpose o f  an experimental 
scheme would be precisely to study problems and attempt various solutions.
In such a venture the church should work in close collaboration with social 
sc ien tis ts , ethnologists, and agricultural experts at a university.
Small-scale manufacturing industry in the rural areas o f  the reserves is 
another p r io r ity  which deserves attention from private organisations.
Dr. E. F. Schumacher and his London-based Intermediate Technology Development 
Group have done a great deal to propagate th is approach to rural development, 
and have introduced in to countries lik e  Botswana and Zambia various types o f  
simple agricultural technology which can be manufactured by peasants. 
Water-storage equipment and rain-catchment storage w ells , designed by 
Schumacher's group, can enable vegetables to be grown in dry areas. Mission 
establishments could consult Dr. Schumacher and other experts on these pro­
cesses and use church buildings and land for the manufacture and t r ia l  use o f 
such equipment, engaging loca l peasants to help in the experiments. Univer­
s it ie s  also have a ro le in studying the loca l needs in the reserves in order 
to design simple equipment which can be produced and maintained by unskilled 
peasants fo r  loca l use. Professor Leistner and others have drawn atten­
tion to the positive e ffe c t  on rural l i f e  o f  small production centres in the 
rural areas. Churches could e ffe c t iv e ly  use some o f th e ir buildings to house 
community centres where possibly small-scale production o f  useful a rtic les  
could be conducted on an experimental basis using loca l labour. This could 
stimulate sim ilar developments in nearby v illages i f  the Bantu Authorities 
became convinced o f  the u t i l it y  o f  th is  type o f endeavour. I t  is  essential 
that such production be simple, labour-intensive and not 'labour-saving' and 
that the artic les  produced are geared to loca l needs and not to a d ifferen t 
culture. There is  scope for inventiveness and imagination in th is type o f 
experiment.
Possibly the most valuable contribution which churches and other private 
bodies can make to human development in the reserves is  in the area o f  peasant 
s k il ls ,  attitudes and morale. Elsewhere in th is paper I  have drawn atten­
tion to the doubts being expressed about the su ita b ility  o f  conventional 
education in under-developed regions. I was horrified  to see a breakdown 
o f  pupils and teachers according to type o f  tra in ing establishment in the 
Tswana reserves, and in Botswana in 1968. Each o f  the two areas had only
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one vocational tra in ing school out o f  a to ta l o f  593 and 274 ordinary
45)schools respectively . The number o f  pupils in vocational and craft tra in ­
ing was miniscule compared with the number studying such non-essential sub­
jects as Latin, European h istory, and litera tu re in conventional schools.
Each o f  these two te rr ito r ie s  has a problem o f  unemployed or under-employed 
school-leavers. The difference between an unemployed craftsman on the one 
hand, and an unemployed matriculant on the other, however, is  that the former 
can make useful things on his own, whereas the la t te r  agonises in unproductive 
frustration.
The need for vocational train ing is  so urgent that I  would suggest that 
private organisations take the step o f attempting to provide informal instruc­
tion in short crash craft courses, even i f  the *c e r t if ic a te s ' are not recog­
nised in it ia l ly .
An even greater need in under-developed regions l ie s  in the area o f 
attitudes and values. Throughout A frica, even the most remotely situated 
tr ib a l peasants have to some extent or another been so affected by colonial 
influences as to desire consumer goods and other trappings o f what they see 
as a superior 'c iv ilis a tio n *  . Some o f  these aspirations are healthy, others 
are not conducive to the type o f  development which under-developed areas have 
to experience. In order to get any development started, as i t  were, a 
s p ir it  o f  'se lf-he lp * has to be engendered, and a s p ir it  o f  community service. 
The ideal would be fo r peasants to relinquish those aspects o f  tr ib a l con­
servatism which contribute to the vicious c irc le  o f  backwardness, and yet to 
retain a pride in th e ir  own co-operative kin-based institu tions. The 
church's greatest resource is  people, and with the assistance o f social 
scientists and African leaders group-training courses could be designed to 
influence the thinking o f lo ca l tr ib a l headmen and other leaders in such a 
way as to fa c ilita te  the emergence o f  a more positive attitude to development. 
The same type o f group -train ing sessions could and should be used to change 
attitudes towards family planning and a host o f other issues relevant to 
development. There is  a great need fo r  churches in under-developed areas to 
avoid at a l l  costs the role o f  providing 'other wordly' panaceas fo r the 
peasants and to  develop human relations s k ills , ta ilored  to the loca l situa­
tion, which are relevant to the problems o f under-development. One specific, 
suggestion is  that lite racy  training has immense value, especia lly i f  the 
content o f  training.and the words used to teach reading are such as to pro­
duce a more sophisticated awareness o f  community issues and goals. The
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church, in its  human relations and communicating role should also keep a 
watching b r ie f  on any negative strains and tensions which emerge in communi­
t ie s  as they begin to change. These problems can often be constructively 
dealt with in group sessions, provided the ministers (group leaders) have an 
intimate knowledge o f  community issues.
Needless to say, th is type o f  role fo r the church, probably requires that 
a somewhat changed curriculum for missionary train ing be introduced, or that 
special courses fo r missionaries be instituted. Above a l l ,  i t  requires 
that missionaries jettison  to ta lly  th e ir former, co lon ia lly inspired ro le  o f 
’ c iv il is in g  the natives' into middle-class urban ways and bookish habits.
There would appear to be a far more crucial practical ro le fo r missionaries 
in developing areas.
F inally, I would lik e  to emphasise once again that what I  have said 
applies, in the South African context, only to Africans permanently resident 
in the reserves, and furthermore only to those reserves where there is  a 
reasonable concensus among' both leaders and tribesmen that an autonomous 
development is  what they want. My remarks do not apply in the s ligh test to 
those African communities which are an in tegral and permanent part o f  the 
common society and the developed economy o f  South A frica . These communities 
have a right to share the prosperity o f  a developed economy with the rest o f 
South A fr ica ’ s peoples, and churches and other private groups should guard 
against attempting to fo is t  separate development on communities which do not 
wish i t  and on people to  whom the policy is  not applicable in objective terms.
r
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